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WHO BAILS? A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF
BAILOUTS UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT
DAVID BLANDING- & SHANE GRANNUM..
INTRODUCTION
Noticeably absent from the Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Shelby
County v. Holder, which invalidated the coverage formula of the Voting
Rights Act (VRA), was any discussion of the fact that covered states and
localities can be released from preclearance requirements using the
"bailout" process stipulated by Section 4. Although the mechanism has
been the subject of considerable legislative, judicial and public debate since
the VRA was first adopted, surprisingly little is known about the factors
that predict successful bailout. Our exploratory study attempts to fill this
gap in scholarly knowledge using a dataset comprised of jurisdictions
covered under the VRA. We derive several alternative hypotheses about the
probability that covered jurisdictions bail out from the VRA and construct
multivariate logistic regression models to test these hypotheses.
Preliminary results indicate that state public policy liberalism, local racial
demographics, and federal legislative changes affect the probability of
bailing out. Specifically, we find that greater liberalism in state policy
preferences is associated with a higher probability of bailing out of the
VRA. In addition, having a higher percentage of black residents in a
jurisdiction is associated with decreased probability of successful bailout.
Finally, we find that jurisdictions covered as a result of the 1970
reauthorization are significantly more likely to have bailed out than ones
covered as a result of the original 1965 law, while jurisdictions covered
under later reauthorizations are no more or less likely to have bailed out.
These findings extend our understanding of state and local responses to
federal mandates, and should be of great interest to policymakers as
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Congress and the Supreme Court continue to wrestle with the
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act.
The Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder was a
landmark setback for the Voting Rights Act.I It represented the first time
the Court had invalidated any provision of the law since it was first
challenged and upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.2 The impetus for
the Shelby majority's departure from previous decisions was its perception
that the federalism costs the Voting Rights Act imposed upon certain states
and localities through the coverage formula were no longer justified by
conditions in those areas. 3 Significant advances in minority political
participation had taken place in the 38 years since the coverage formula
had last been revised. 4 The formula's success was thus its own undoing.
The majority contended that Congress had failed to heed reservations the
Court had expressed about the incompatibility of the temporary provisions
of the Voting Rights Act with "current conditions" in Northwest Austin
Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder (hereafter NAMUDNO)
four years earlier. This left the Court "no choice" in its mind but to declare
the existing coverage formula unconstitutional. 5
Conspicuously absent from the Roberts Court's analysis of the VRA in
Shelby was any discussion of the role § 4(a) 6 might have played in
balancing out the burdens of preclearance. § 4(a) of the VRA is the
provision that allows covered jurisdictions to terminate federal supervision
of their election laws by obtaining a declaratory judgment from the D.C.
District Court. 7 The absence of discussion of the bailout mechanism is
particularly striking given the fact that the provision had been praised in the
past as an example of congressional conscientiousness in lawmaking. 8 Had
the Roberts Court scrutinized use of the bailout provision by covered states
and municipalities more closely, it might have at least tempered its
1 Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
2 S.C. v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
3 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2618 ("There is no denying, however, that the conditions that
originally justified these measures no longer characterize voting in covered jurisdictions.").
4 The majority in Shelby noted that black voter turnout exceeded white voter turnout in
covered jurisdictions (Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612), and cited an appellate judge's earlier observation
that "[c]overed jurisdictions havefar more black officeholders as a portion of the black population than
do uncovered ones" (Autotel v. Nev. Bell Tel. Co., 697 F 3d. 848 (2012; emphasis in original).
5 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
6 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a) (West).
7 Id.
8 In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court drew attention to the fact that, unlike the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, which it ultimately declared unconstitutional, the Voting Rights Act was
characterized by "termination dates, geographic restrictions, [and] egregious predicates." 521 U.S. 507,
533 (1997).
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concerns about the federalism costs the preclearance requirement imposed
upon states and municipalities with a history of racial inequality in political
participation. The bailout mechanism ensures that jurisdictions that can
demonstrate sustained, good faith effort to eradicate racially discriminatory
election practices and the remnants thereof will not be at the mercy of the
federal government permanently. It should therefore have been a
component of the Court's assessment of the federalism costs of the Voting
Rights Act in Shelby.
The bailout mechanism has been the subject of considerable legislative,
judicial, and scholarly debate since the VRA was first adopted, 9 yet
surprisingly little is known about the factors that lead to bailout. This
exploratory study attempts to fill this gap in knowledge using a dataset
comprised of jurisdictions covered under the VRA's different formulas
since 1965. We examine several possible predictors of bailout from the
VRA and construct multivariate logistic regression models to test the
correlations of these factors with the act of bailing out. Results suggest that
state public policy liberalism, local racial demographics, and federal
legislative changes all affect the probability that a covered jurisdiction bails
out.
Part I of this article traces the legislative history of the bailout provision
from the 1965 law to the 2006 Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and
Amendments Act.10 We note that amendments to the §4(b) coverage
formula during the 1970 and 1975 reauthorizations to account for the
persistence of discrimination and inequality in elections not only expanded
the geographic application of the §5 preclearance provision substantially,
but also yielded few bailouts. However, Congress' attempt to facilitate
bailouts of political subdivisions after City of Rome v. US led dozens to
begin applying after about a decade. Most strikingly, all of the covered
jurisdictions that applied for bailout after 1997 were successful, casting
doubt upon claims that bailing out was too difficult. 1 Part II examines how
9 See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 212 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); J. Gerald Hebert, An Assessment of the Bailout
Provisions of the Voting Rights Act, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006:
PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER 257 (Ana Henderson ed., 2007); Michael
P. McDonald, Who's Covered? Coverage Formula and Bailout, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT 255 (David L. Epstein et al. eds., 2006); Richard A. Williamson, The 1982 Amendments to
the Voting Rights Act: A Statutory Analysis of the Revised Bailout Provisions, 62 WASH. U. L. Q. 001
(1984); and Paul Winke, Why the Preclearance and Bailout Provisions of the Voting Rights Act Are
Still a Constitutionally Proportional Remedy, 28 N. Y. UNIV. REV. LAW SOC. CHANGE 69 (2003).
10 Fannie Lou Hamer et al., Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006).
11 J. Gerald Herbert, An Assessment of the Bailout Provisions of The Voting Rights Act, in
VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006: DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER 262-66
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the Supreme Court interpreted this provision from South Carolina v.
Katzenbach to Shelby County v. Holder. We trace the shift in the Court's
views of the bailout provision from reverence in cases like Boerne v. Flores
to tacit disdain in NAMUDNO. Part III presents the results of our
multivariate analysis of bailouts in covered jurisdictions. Specifically, we
find that being in a state with more liberal policy preferences is associated
with a higher probability of bailing out of the VRA. In addition, having a
higher percentage of black residents in a jurisdiction is associated with
decreased probability of successful bailout. Finally, we find that
jurisdictions covered as a result of the 1970 reauthorization are
significantly more likely to have bailed out than ones covered as a result of
the original 1965 law, while jurisdictions covered under later
reauthorizations are no more or less likely to have bailed out. The final
section of the manuscript considers the implications of our findings for
ongoing debates about the Voting Rights Act. The findings presented in
this exploratory article extend our understanding of state and local
responses to federal mandates, and should be of great interest to both
scholars and policymakers as Congress and the Supreme Court continue to
wrestle with the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE BAILOUT PROVISION
The 1965 Voting Rights Act was designed to provide the federal
government a comprehensive instrument for remedying electoral injuries
African Americans had suffered since the end of Reconstruction,12
including poll taxes, literacy tests, and all manner of intimidation and
harassment. 13 Congress dealt with these violations of the Fifteenth
Amendment by outlawing racial discrimination in elections in §2.14
Additionally, Congress prohibited states and localities from intimidating
prospective voters in §11(b)15 and from providing false information to
voters in § 11(c). 16 Another important section of the law, §3(a), authorized
the U.S. Department of Justice to dispatch federal employees to monitor
local elections.1 7 The bulk of the VRA's power to confront voting
(Ana Hernandez ed., 2006).
12 We use the terms "black" and "African American" interchangeably throughout this article.
13 History of the VRA, THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (last visited Jun. 15, 2015),
http://www.civilrights.org/voting-rights/vra/history.html.
14 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301(a) (West).
15 52 U.S.C.A. § 10307(b) (West).
16 52 U.S.C.A. § 10307(c) (West).
17 52 U.S.C.A. § 10302(a) (West).
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discrimination nevertheless derived from §5, which required jurisdictions
with a record of racial discrimination in voting to obtain approval from the
U.S. Attorney General or a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia of all proposed election laws before implementing
them.18 Which jurisdictions were subject to this preclearance provision was
determined by §4(b), commonly known as the "coverage formula."1 9 All or
parts of 21 states have been affected by the three iterations of the coverage
formula the Voting Rights Act has employed. 20
Figure 1. States Affected by the Voting Rights Act
This figure shows states that have been either fully or partially covered as a
result of changes to the coverage formula of the Voting Rights Act in 1965,
1970, and 1975.21 No new jurisdictions were added after 1975, the last year
the coverage formula was revised.22 However, many jurisdictions have
bailed out since 1975, partly as a result of changes to the preconditions for
bailout.2 3
18 52 U.S.C.A. § 10302(c) (West); If the Attorney General denied preclearance for a specific
voting change, a jurisdiction could either pursue declaratory judgment on behalf of the federal court in
D.C. or revise the law and resubmit it for preclearance.
19 52 U.S.C.A. § 10303(b) (West).
20 See Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (last
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In the 1965 law, §4(b) singled out jurisdictions that employed a "test or
device" to determine a resident's eligibility to vote as of November 1, 1964
and either had voter registration rates less than 50 percent as of November
1, 1964 or had voter turnout rates less than 50 percent in the 1964
presidential election.2 4 This formula resulted in full coverage of seven
different states: Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina, and Virginia.2 5 Additionally, the formula captured four counties
in Arizona, one county in Hawaii, one county in Idaho, and forty counties
in North Carolina. These jurisdictions were required to submit all voting
laws for preclearance changes before implementing them.2 6
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 did not immediately end racial
discrimination in American elections. Instead, by 1970, new improprieties
and victims had emerged. States had begun to adopt laws aimed not at the
outright disenfranchisement of black voters, but at attenuating the power of
the ballots these voters cast. 27 Furthermore, violations of the rights of
Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans to vote resulting from policies and
practices that rested upon English language ability came to Congress'
attention. 28 Congress responded by extending the temporary provisions of
the Act for another five years, inserting a provision for language assistance
to minorities, and extending the geographic scope of the coverage
formula. 29 Changes in the coverage formula meant that jurisdictions that
employed electoral devices or tests or had low registration and turnout in
24 Id; The architects of the 1965 Voting Rights Act justified the extraordinary protections
provided by §4(b) and §5 by reminding members of Congress in 1965 that previous efforts to address
racial discrimination in voting had all but failed. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1957 had allowed the
U.S. Attorney General to bring suits in federal courts on behalf of aggrieved parties in jurisdictions that
had implemented discriminatory voting laws, for example, these suits would languor in the courts for
weeks and months while voters remained disenfranchised. Moreover, the vast majority of voting
discrimination suits were brought in southern federal courts, where judges were generally more
sympathetic to Jim Crow laws. Testifying in front of the House Judiciary Committee in March 1965,
Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach said that the extraordinary provisions of the VRA were
designed to protect minority voters from "a desire [on the part of State legislatures].. to outguess the
courts of the United States or even to outguess the Congress of the United States" by passing a plethora
of discriminatory laws that neither the federal government nor Congress could feasibly stop. See Allen
v. State Bd of Elections, 393 U.S. 567 (1980).
25 Id. supra note 20.
26 Id.
27 For examples of vote dilution tactics used in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, see Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman,
QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990 (1994); See
also Allen, 393 U.S. at 550-53 (listing new election laws in Mississippi and Virginia that introduced at-
large voting, transformed elective offices into appointive offices, placed certain prohibitions on
potential independent candidates, and developed new procedures for casting votes for write-in
candidates).
28 See Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 20.
29 Id.
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the presidential election of 1968 were now required to pre-clear new voting
laws with the federal government. The 1970 revision of the coverage
formula resulted in coverage of five counties in Arizona; two counties in
California; three towns in Connecticut; 18 political subdivisions in Maine;
nine towns in Massachusetts; ten towns in New Hampshire; three counties
in New York; and one county in Wyoming. 30
When it reviewed the temporary provisions of the Voting Rights Act in
1975, Congress again found evidence of racial discrimination, particularly
in a comprehensive report submitted to Congress by the U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights (USCCR).31 These observations led Congress to extend the
temporary provisions of the VRA for seven years and expand the
geographic reach of the preclearance requirement to new areas of the
country. 32 Now, jurisdictions employing discriminatory tests or devices or
exhibiting low voter registration or turnout as of the 1972 presidential
election were subject to federal preclearance. 33 This modification of the
coverage formula brought Texas and Arizona, two counties in California,
five counties in Florida, two townships in Michigan, one county in North
Carolina, three counties in New Mexico, two counties in Oklahoma, and
two counties in South Dakota under the federal regulatory umbrella.34 The
third coverage formula resulted in the most expansive geographic coverage
yet, and substantially altered the previous map of covered jurisdictions. 35
The architects of the §4(b) coverage formula clearly sought to capture as
many jurisdictions with records of racial discrimination in voting as
possible. However, the coverage formula sometimes unintentionally
subjected jurisdictions to §5 preclearance that did not have records of
30 Id.
31 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS & UNITED STATES, THE VOTING RIGHTS




34 See Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 20; Congress also used the 1975
reauthorization process to strengthen the provision for providing election assistance to language
minorities, as electoral disparities persisted for language minorities after 1970. Id. at 328-336. The
revised language assistance provision drew special attention to political jurisdictions that would not
otherwise have fallen under federal supervision. Two counties in New York and one county in Arizona,
already required to seek preclearance for racial discrimination against black voters, were also covered
because of evidence of discrimination against Spanish-language and American Indian-language
minorities, respectively. Three counties in Arizona that had been released from the preclearance
requirement were once again captured because of evidence indicating discrimination against American
Indian-language minorities. Finally, the state of Alaska, which had been exempted from preclearance
previously, was covered again because of discrimination against Alaskan Native-language minorities.
35 See Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 20.
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racial discrimination per se. 36 For example, Elmore County, Idaho met the
criteria of having employed a "test or device" and of having turnout below
50 percent in the 1964 presidential election because it prohibited prostitutes
from voting and had a significant population of military personnel who
were registered to vote outside the state. 3 7 The 1965 Voting Rights Act
militated against such supererogatory coverage by authorizing the federal
courts to exempt from preclearance jurisdictions that had been directly
covered and could prove that they had not enacted a racially discriminatory
test or device in the preceding five years.3 8 Codified as §4(a) of the Act,
this "bailout" mechanism "was designed to allow the immediate exemption
of those covered states or independently covered political subdivisions that
had not discriminated on the basis of race in registering voters or
conducting elections." 39 Prior to 1980, some political subdivisions of fully
covered states understood the bailout mechanism to mean that a covered
jurisdiction could essentially seek refuge from the preclearance
requirement piecemeal by demonstrating that some part of the jurisdiction
satisfied the criteria for bailout. 40 But as the Court held in City of Rome v.
US, subdivisions of properly covered political jurisdictions could not
pursue bailout independently. 4 1 Thus for example, the City of Birmingham,
Alabama could not bail out unless the State of Alabama as a whole did,
because Alabama itself had met the criteria for coverage under the original
formula. The original bailout provision merely provided an escape route for
improperly covered jurisdictions.
As the coverage formula was amended, so too was the bailout provision.
In 1970, Congress extended the number of years covered jurisdictions
needed to be free of discriminatory tests and election devices from five to
ten.42 This change made it very difficult for a jurisdiction to bail out unless
it had been improperly identified for coverage. With the expansion of §4(b)
in 1975 to protect language minority groups against English-only voting
36 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SECTION 4 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/misc/sec 4.php (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).
37 See id.
38 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia had exclusive jurisdiction over all
"bailout" cases in the country. As with §5 preclearance, the rationale here was that a large number of
southern judges would be sympathetic to segregationists attempting to undermine preclearance.
Keeping bailout litigation in the D.C. federal court would, in theory, ensure impartiality.
39 Paul Hancock & Lora Tredway, The Bailout Standard of the Voting Rights Act: An
Incentive to End Discrimination, 17 URB. LAW., 379, 391-92 (1985).
40 See infra note 38.
41 See City of Rome v. U.S., 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (holding that a jurisdiction was ineligible
for bailout if it did not register its own voters).
42 See Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 20.
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practices and ballots, the bailout provision also evolved into two different
sets of criteria.43 One set applied to political jurisdictions covered because
of discrimination against racial minorities. A covered jurisdiction with a
history of racial discrimination was now required to prove that it had not
enacted a test or device with the purpose of denying or abridging the right
of racial minorities to vote in the preceding 17 years.44 Another set of
criteria applied to jurisdictions covered because of discrimination against
language minorities. A jurisdiction that had been subject to preclearance for
discriminating against language minorities was required to prove that it had
not implemented an English-only voting barrier.45
Neither the 1970 nor the 1975 reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act
provided an incentive or clear pathway for covered jurisdictions to bail
out.46 By repeatedly extending the timeframe in which a jurisdiction must
not have enacted a test or device, Congress made it difficult for most
jurisdictions to bail out prior to the 1982 amendments to the bailout
provision. Moreover, courts remained skeptical that most jurisdictions
could enact and implement nondiscriminatory voting changes without
federal scrutiny.47 In Virginia v. United States, the Supreme Court affirmed
the D.C. federal court's decision to deny the Commonwealth of Virginia's
application for bailout.48 Virginia became the second (and remains the most
recent) fully-covered state to apply for bailout.49 As law professor Timothy
O'Rourke notes, "Virginia had sought to distinguish its suit from Gaston
County on the grounds that the Commonwealth, unlike Gaston County, had
not sought 'to reinstate [its] literacy test."' 50 But the D.C. court, and later
the Supreme Court, argued that "this may change the consequences of an
exemption, [but] it does not change the criteria for obtaining one." 51 Even
after the D.C. federal court admitted that Virginia's literacy test had only
been enacted after "an exhaustive canvass of registrars throughout the
43 See id
44 An Act to amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 94-73, Tit. I, § 101, 89 Stat.
400 (1975) (prior to 1982 amendment).
45 Id. at Tit. II, § 201; In amending the bailout criteria in 1975, Congress did not characterize
any specific types of English-only voting barriers as discriminatory. The statute left this determination
up to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
46 See Pub.L. 91-285, § 2, 84 Stat. 314 (1970); Pub. L. No. 94-73, Tit. I, § 101, 89 Stat. 400
(1975).
47 See infra note 47.
48 Virginia v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 1319, 1321 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, sub nom. Virginia
v. United States, 420 U.S. 901 (1975).
49 See infra note 49.
50 Timothy O'Rourke, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982: The New Bailout Provision
and Virginia, 69 VA. LAW REV. 776 (1983).
51 Id. at 776.
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states plus a good faith attempt to solicit information from black leaders,"52
the Court argued that the test would likely dilute the black vote
considerably. 53 In other words, even jurisdictions that managed to
demonstrate some constructive efforts to weed out discrimination in their
voting changes could not escape federal scrutiny. In the 1970s, federal
courts denied bailout to six applicants. 54 Jurisdictions that had already
bailed out were also unsafe: political subdivisions in Alaska55 and New
York56 that had successfully bailed out were later bailed back in upon
further investigation from federal authorities. Pursuant to the §4(b)
amendment of 1970, three counties in Arizona and one county in Idaho
were re-covered due to maintaining a 'test or device' to determine voter
eligibility and/or persistent low turnout in presidential elections. 57
Between 1966 and 1970, six jurisdictions successfully bailed out of
preclearance: the State of Alaska; three counties in Arizona (Apache,
Coconino, and Navajo); one county in Idaho (Elmore); and one county in
North Carolina (Wake).58 Two counties in North Carolina (Gaston and
Nash) applied for bailout but were rejected; in both cases, the U.S.
Supreme Court rendered decisions against bailout.59 In Gaston County v.
52 Virginia, 386 F. Supp. At 1321, aff'd, 420 U.S. 901.
53 Id.
54 See, e.g., id.; Yuba Cnty. v. United States, No. 75-2170 (D.D.C. May 25, 1976); El Paso
Cnty. v, United States, No. 77-0815 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 1977); and City of Rome v. United States, 446
U.S. 156, 162-70 (1980).
55 The State of Alaska successfully bailed out of the preclearance requirement in 1966. See
Alaska v. United States, No. 101-66 (D.D.C. August 17, 1966). Pursuant to the 1970 amendments to
§4(b) coverage, election districts 8, 11, 12, and 16 were re-covered. In 1972, a lawsuit brought on
behalf of the State of Alaska was successful in bailing out all 4 re-covered election districts. Thus, the
State of Alaska was again exempt from federal preclearance as of March 1972. See Alaska v. United
States, No. 2122-71 (D.D.C. March 10, 1972). Pursuant to the 1975 amendments to §4(b) coverage,
which stipulated protections for voters who belonged to language minority groups, the State of Alaska
was re-covered for discrimination against Alaskan Native-language minority groups. See 40 Fed. Reg.
49, 422 (1975). The State of Alaska was unsuccessful in its attempt to bail out again in 1979. See
Alaska v. United States, No. 78-0484 (D.D.C. May 10, 1979). The State of Alaska's complicated
history with the bailout provision continued in 1984, when the State's bailout application was denied
right before the new criteria were implemented on August 5, 1984. See The Bailout Standard, supra
note 18, at 415. See also Alaska v. United States, No. 84-1362 (D.D.C. July 24, 1984).
56 Three counties in the State of New York, all in New York City, were covered pursuant to
the 1970 amendments to §4(b) coverage formula: Kings County (Queens); Bronx County; and New
York County (Manhattan). A lawsuit brought on behalf of the State of New York successfully bailed all
three counties out of federal preclearance as of April 1972. See New York v. United States, No. 2419-
71 (D.D.C. April 3, 1972). In 1973, the U.S. Attorney General re-opened bailout litigation and each of
the three bailed out counties was covered again in January 1974. See New York v. United States, No.
2419-71 (D.D.C. January 10, 1974), aff'd, 419 U.S. 888 (1974).
57 See Hancock & Tredway, supra note 38, at 396. See also 36 Fed. Reg. 5809 (1971).
58 See Apache Cnty. v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903, 906 (D.D.C. 1966) (Arizona); Gaston
Cnty. v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 678, 694-95 (D.D.C. 1968) (referencing the bailouts of Wake
County, North Carolina; Elmore County, Idaho; and the State of Alaska).
59 See Bills to Amend the Voting Rights Act: Hearings on S. 53, S. 1761, S. 1975, S. 1992,
and H.R. 3112 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
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United States, the majority opinion held that Gaston County "had not met
its burden of proving that its use of the literacy test, in the context of its
historic maintenance of segregated and unequal schools, did not
discriminatorily deprive Negroes of the franchise." 60 Michael McDonald
argues in his essay "Who's Covered? Coverage Formula and Bailout" that
the Supreme Court's decision in Gaston County likely derailed steps taken
by Congress to open bailout to jurisdictions compliant with the Voting
Rights Act, since a "history of segregation prior to 1964 could be factored
into bailout decisions." 61
After the Supreme Court's controversial decisions in City of Rome v.
United States and Mobile v. Bolden, Congress began debating the merits of
reauthorizing the temporary provisions of the VRA for a third time. 62 As
amended in 1982, the Voting Rights Act included two new sections that
effectively overrode both of these Supreme Court decisions. In
contravention of Mobile, the new Voting Rights Act clarified that
establishing that a law had or would have a discriminatory effect was
sufficient to prove a denial of voting rights.63 More pertinently, Congress
responded to City of Rome by revising the bailout section to enable political
subdivisions of fully covered states to bail out of preclearance
independently. 64 Under the bailout criteria included in the 1982 iteration of
the Voting Rights Act, a subdivision could bail out of preclearance
requirements if it demonstrated that it: had not used a racially
discriminatory test or device over the past ten years; had not passed a law
that diluted ballots cast by minority voters; had not been convicted of racial
discrimination in its election practices; had not had a federal examiner
monitor its elections; had pre-cleared all changes in election law within its
Cong., 2d Sess. 1742-43 (1982) (attachment C-1 to statement of Assistant Attorney General Reynolds).
60 Gaston Cnty. v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 288 (1969).
61 McDonald, supra note 9, at258.
62 In Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), a majority of Supreme Court justices ruled that
litigants could only prove discrimination in voting based on race, color, or language minority status if
they showed that voting changes in a given jurisdiction were enacted with discriminatory intent.
Previously, showing that a voting change had disparately disenfranchised black voters was sufficient to
find a jurisdiction in violation of the Voting Rights Act.
63 Discontent with the decision in Mobile v. Bolden was expressed by members of Congress,
witnesses, and committee reports throughout deliberations on the 1982 amendments. Senator Charles C.
Mathias of Maryland who exemplified this discontent in his statement submitted for the record of the
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee on January 27, 1982, said that "the plurality in Bolden places a
virtually impossible burden on plaintiffs" and reflects "a crippling blow to the overall effectiveness of
the Act." He noted that, as a result of the decision, "plaintiffs must reach back into time and produce
direct evidence of discriminatory purpose" and compel Congress to "correct the plurality's
misinterpretation of Congressional intent in Bolden and restore the original meaning of Section 2." See
Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments To The Voting Rights Act: A
Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1390 (1983).
64 See infra note 64.
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jurisdiction; and had made a sustained effort to eliminate intimidation and
harassment and expand registration opportunities for minority voters. 65 The
revised bailout provision gave both the U.S. Attorney General and the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia discretion to disregard "trivial"
violations of the preclearance requirement, "promptly corrected" errors,
and violations that "were not repeated." 66 At the same time, the revised
bailout provision authorized the U.S. District Court to reopen litigation if,
within ten years of bailing out, a jurisdiction was suspected of engaging in
conduct proscribed by the Act. 67
These revisions were at once catalytic and inhibitive. On the one hand,
the new criteria represented the first genuine opportunity for political
subdivisions within covered states to regain autonomy over their election
processes. The U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the
Constitution argued that "[b]ailout is clearly achievable" and predicted that
one quarter of counties in covered states would be eligible for bailout
immediately. 68 On the other hand, the volume and specificity of the new
criteria led many to conclude that it would be difficult, if not altogether
impossible, for most political subdivisions to avail themselves of the new
bailout provision.69
Reflecting the majority view that the new criteria would make it easier
65 Jurisdictions that had failed to pre-clear election law changes could do so nunc pro tune (or
retroactively) without penalty at the time of their application for bailout. See 42 U.S.C. §1973b(a)(3)
(1982), invalidated by Shelby Cnty., Ala., v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
66 See 42 U.S.C. §1973b(a)(3) (1982).
67 See id.
68 See S. Rep 97-417, at 60 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 238.
69 For example, in a June 1982 hearing on the Voting Rights Act amendment, Senator Orrin
Hatch (R-UT) opined that "[w]e have now substituted for that single [bailout] factor six or seven new
factors that require additional efforts, and that place additional burdens upon the States." See 128 Cong.
Rec. 13297 (1982). Similarly, Representative Caldwell Butler (R-VA) went so far as to suggest that the
new provision "is wholly unreasonable and affords merely an illusory opportunity to be released from
coverage." See S. Rep 97-417, at 168 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 341. Some legal
commentators were also dubious of the possibility that a high number of bailouts would suddenly occur.
Shortly after the 1982 reauthorization of the VRA, for example, Professor O'Rourke wrote that "[i]t is
unlikely, in my view, that all jurisdictions can qualify for bailout under the new provision by 1992.
First, many jurisdictions will not be able to meet the provision's [Section 5] compliance standards.
Second, many jurisdictions may not be able to satisfy the provision's "positive steps"
requirement... since the meaning of "constructive efforts" is ambiguous, jurisdictions may be unable to
determine what kind of action is necessary or sufficient to satisfy the terms of the law. See O'Rourke,
supra note 22, at 789. Similarly, Paul Hancock and Laura Tredway offered several reasons few
jurisdictions would suddenly bail out: "individual counties within covered states may be unaware of the
opportunity for an independent bailout action under the new standard. Covered jurisdictions may view
the standard as difficult when compared to the burdens of continued coverage and may simply have
elected to remain covered. Other jurisdictions may remain unwilling to take the corrective action
necessary to allow minority citizens a fair opportunity for full and effective participation. It is equally
possible, however, that a substantial number of jurisdictions are laying the required groundwork for
bailout, as evidenced by the [recent] increase in section 5 submissions." See The Bailout Standard,
supra note 18, at 422.
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for jurisdictions to bail out of the VRA, Congress postponed
implementation until August 5, 1984 "to allow the Department of Justice
'to prepare for such a heavy load of litigation under the new standards."' 70
Some members of Congress sought to prevent jurisdictions with a history
of racial discrimination in voting from escaping scrutiny under the new
criteria by expanding the timeframe for eligibility under the old criteria
from 17 to 19 years.7 1 But, ultimately, a small number of jurisdictions did
bail out during the interim period: one county in Colorado that had been
denied previously (El Paso); three towns in Connecticut (Groton,
Mansfield, and Southbury); one county in Hawaii (Honolulu); one county
in Idaho (Elmore); nine towns in Massachusetts (Amherst, Ayer,
Belchertown, Bourne, Harvard, Sandwich, Shirley, Sunderland, and
Wrentham); and one county in Wyoming (Campbell).7 2 Alaska attempted
to bail out under the pre-1982 criteria, but its application was not
considered until the new criteria were activated and the federal government
determined that Alaska should pursue bailout under the new standards.
Bailout outcomes since the 1982 Voting Right Act reauthorization
comport with the projections of both critics and proponents of the revised
bailout language. On the one hand, the sudden increase in new applicants
predicted by some congressional leaders never materialized; no jurisdiction
applied for bailout under the amended standards until 1997. On the other
hand, every jurisdiction that has applied for bailout since 1997 has been
successful. 73 This perfect rate of success calls into question the assertions
of some that the bailout criteria are unduly onerous, or that the Department
of Justice has been unwilling to consent to bailouts.74 To the contrary, it
appears that the bailout mechanism is working as intended to reward those
jurisdictions that have made genuine long-term efforts at reducing the
vestiges of racial discrimination in elections. The best explanation for the
paucity of bailed out political jurisdictions may well be that, as former
Department of Justice attorney Gerald Hebert wrote nearly a decade ago,
"jurisdictions are just not applying." 75 Unfortunately, these historical
developments escaped the Roberts Court in Shelby.
70 See id. at 411.
71 See Pub.L. 97-205, § 2, 96 Stat. 134 (1982).
72 Id. at 412-15.
73 See Hebert, supra note 9, at 270
74 See Nw, Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S 193 (2009) (Thomas, C.J.,
Concurring and Dissenting).
75 See Hebert, supra note 9, at 270.
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II. JUDICIAL APPRAISALS OF THE BAILOUT PROVISION
A review of previous opinions concerning the Voting Rights Act affirms
that the Supreme Court's attitude toward the bailout provision evolved
from reverence to tacit disdain in relatively short order. This disdain
seemed to rest not on the availability of empirical evidence about bailout
outcomes, but on suppositions and secondhand information about the
bailout process. By the time the Shelby County case reached its docket, the
Court seemed persuaded by a cadre of observers who had long asserted that
the 1975 formula did not reflect "current political conditions." 76
References to the section of the Voting Rights Act that allows covered
jurisdictions to terminate federal preclearance of their election laws are
relatively neutral prior to Boerne v. Flores.77 The Court's first opportunity
to assess the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act bailout provision
arose in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.78 South Carolina had asked the
Court to rule that it was improper for Congress to delegate authority to
review bailout petitions to the District Court for the District of Columbia
only.79 In addition, the state contended that the bailout procedures were "a
nullity because they impose an impossible burden of proof upon States and
political subdivisions entitled to relief."80 The majority in Katzenbach
rejected both of these arguments in no uncertain terms.81 The Court found
that the bailout provision represented a proper use of Congress' Article III
authority to establish lower federal courts. 82 Moreover, since "an area need
do no more than submit affidavits from voting officials, asserting that they
have not been guilty of racial discrimination through the use of tests and
devices during the past five years, and then refute whatever evidence to the
contrary may be adduced by the Federal Government," the Court held that
"the burden of proof is quite bearable." 83 Here, then, the Court not only
countenanced the bailout provision, but dismissed criticism that its burdens
were too onerous to satisfy.
The bailout provision became an issue once again in City of Rome v.
76 See, e.g., Abigail Thernstrom, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS (1987); Abigail Thernstrom, VOTING RIGHTS-AND WRONGS: THE
ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIALLY FAIR ELECTIONS (2009).
77 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
78 State of S.C. v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 332 (U.S.S.C. 1966) abrogated by Shelby Cnty.,





83 Id. at 332.
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United States, when a city in Georgia asked the court to exempt it from
federal supervision of its election laws. 84 In denying the request, the Court
held that Rome was not a "political subdivision" or "state" within the
meaning of §4(a), since it was only subject to preclearance as a result of the
entire state of Georgia having been covered. 85 To be eligible for bailout,
Rome would have to have been brought under the auspices of the federal
government independently of the state.86 Absent this fact, Rome was
eligible to bail out only if the entire state of Georgia were eligible. 8 7 The
majority's decision was not uncontroversial. Justice Powell argued in his
dissent that the majority was engaged in a "protean construction [that]
reduces the statute to irrationality" 88 because it had ruled two years earlier
in United States v. Sheffield that the term "state" in §4(a) of the Voting
Rights Act applied to both states as a whole and subdivisions thereof.8 9 Yet
this apparent contradiction had the effect of affirming that the bailout
provision was designed to reward political jurisdictions that had made good
faith efforts to remedy racial discrimination in elections. Rome, whatever
kind of political unit it might have been, had made legislative changes that
"reduced the importance of the votes of Negro citizens." 90 Powell's dissent
nevertheless suggests that he regarded the bailout provision as the fulcrum
in the balance between federal authority to remedy violations of voting
rights and "local control of the means of self-government." 9 1 After
challenging the correctness of the majority's interpretation of §4(a), he took
a slightly different tack and concluded that the majority's interpretation
"renders the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional as applied to the city of
Rome." 92 For Justice Powell, the constitutionality of the coverage formula
and preclearance provision depended upon coterminous application of the
bailout provision: "If §4(a) imposes the burden of preclearance on Rome,
the same section must also relieve that burden when the city can
demonstrate its compliance with the Act's quite strict requirements for
bailout." 93 The majority's refusal to extend even the possibility of bailout





88 Id. at 198 (Powell, J. dissenting).
89 United States v. Bd. Of Comm'rs of Sheffield, Ala., 435 U.S. 110 (1978).
90 Rome, 446 U.S. at 187.
91 Id. at 201.
92 See id
93 Id. at 200.
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to Rome made the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional because it allowed
the federal government to encroach upon state and local administration of
elections without offering them some mechanism for regaining their
autonomy. The majority opinion in Shelby County v. Holder recognized no
such interdependence, but if Powell's dissent is any indication, the bailout
mechanism could have been treated as a counterweight to the coverage
formula.
The strongest endorsement of the bailout provision came when the
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act was not at issue. In Boerne v.
Flores,94 the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) by drawing repeated
comparisons to the Voting Rights Act.95 The majority noted that whereas a
substantial record of racially discriminatory voting laws and practices had
buttressed the Voting Rights Act, the RFRA lacked a comparable
evidentiary record. 96 Instead, proponents of the RFRA had provided only
anecdotal evidence of alleged violations of the religious freedom people of
Jewish or Hmong descent. 97 The Court implicitly praised the fact that the
VRA's temporary provisions "were confined to those regions of the
country where voting discrimination has been most flagrant," as well as the
fact that the provisions "affected a discrete class of state laws, i.e., state
voting laws." 98 These were in contrast to the "sweeping coverage" of the
RFRA, which represented an "intrusion at every level of government" into
"official actions of almost every description" and "[applied] to all Federal,
State, and local Governments." 99 The Court cast a particularly positive
light upon the bailout provision by acknowledging the absence of a
comparable measure in the RFRA: "RFRA has no termination date or
termination mechanism."100 By contrast, the VRA authorized jurisdictions
subject to its more onerous requirements to terminate their subordinate
administrative status by satisfying certain criteria. The Court seemed to
pronounce the bailout provision a model of conscientious legislative
design. Along with the evidentiary record and narrow tailoring, the bailout
provision "tend[ed] to ensure Congress' means are proportionate to ends
legitimate."1 0 1
94 City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 531.
98 Idat 533.
99 Id. at 532.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 533.
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The Roberts Court offered a decidedly different rendering of the bailout
provision when it took up the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act in
NAMUDNO.102 Indeed, its rationale for ultimately granting Northwest
Austin an exemption from the preclearance requirements ran directly
counter to the language used to uphold the Voting Rights Act in City of
Rome. 103 Alluding to the government's argument that the utility district met
the definition of a "state" under §4(a) but not the definition of a "political
subdivision," the Court lamented that this interpretation "has helped to
render the bailout provision all but a nullity."104 The similarity of this
language with the government's unsuccessful argument in South Carolina
v. Katzenbach and the irony of the fact that the Court's shift in attitude
toward the bailout provision occurred against the backdrop of a rapid
redesign of the bailout provision to facilitate bailouts by political
subdivisions should not be lost. Here, the Court was offering its harshest
criticism of the bailout provision yet. Also, the decision was the first to
command a majority of the justices, decades after successful bailouts by
dozens of political subdivisions around the country under a version of the
bailout provision developed precisely for that purpose. The Court's
antagonistic posture might explain why it did not address the "symmetry"
of the bailout provision and coverage formula in Shelby: by then it had
already decided that the scale had tipped in favor of federal control.
III. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF §4 BAILOUTS
Identifying factors that affect the probability of bailout out of the
preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act requires an
understanding of: (1) how state and local governments respond to federal
laws and (2) the conditions under which state and local governments create
new policies. Since the bailout process depends both upon the rules
articulated by the federal government and upon the initiative of covered
jurisdictions, bailout represents an example of both federalism and policy
102 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S 193, 196-97 (2009) (In a
surprising decision over a provision that has consistently been upheld as constitutional, the Court held
that the District is eligible under the Voting Rights Act to seek bailout for release from its pre-clearance
requirements to make changes to its board elections).
103 Id. at 202 (holding that "although the historic accomplishments of the Voting Rights Act
are undeniable," it "now raises serious constitutional concerns. The preclearance requirement represents
an intrusion into areas of state and local responsibility that is otherwise unfamiliar to our federal system.
Some of the conditions that the Court relied upon in upholding this statutory scheme have
unquestionably improved, and the Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by current
needs").
104 Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 211.
18 JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 28:1
innovation at work.
The bailout process implicates federalism because covered jurisdictions
must meet certain federal prerequisites to be initially eligible for bailout. 105
From the perspective of state and local actors, compliance with any federal
mandate entails both consequences and rewards.106 Covered jurisdictions
that bail out must first weigh the consequences of noncompliance with
federal preclearance requirements and the benefits of compliance with the
federal requirements. Then they must weigh the costs of the bailout process
against the benefits of a successful bailout. In short, the rules set by the
federal government are paramount to the decision making of covered
jurisdictions. Since compliance with §5 creates the preconditions for
bailout under §4(b), we assume that those factors most conducive to
compliance with §5 will also be conducive to bailout. Conversely, factors
that tend to undermine state and local compliance with federal law should
also decrease the probability of terminating federal control over election
lawmaking in covered jurisdictions.
The bailout process is also an example of policy innovation. While the
preclearance provision imposes certain constraints upon the development
and implementation of new election laws in covered jurisdictions, the
bailout provision preserves some degree of local autonomy over the federal
government's election supervision role by allowing covered jurisdictions to
terminate the relationship. Covered jurisdictions that pursue bailout are in
some sense exercising the kind of prerogative that states and localities do
when they enact licensing laws, smoking bans, or other policies. Even
though they must meet federal preconditions, these jurisdictions decide for
themselves whether and when to initiate the bailout process. 107
Political scientists know a great deal about the factors that influence state
and local behaviors in the context of federalism and policy innovation. In
general, we expect that characteristics of covered jurisdictions that are
more conducive to compliance with federal mandates will also be more
conducive to bailout, since successful bailout has historically required
compliance with the preconditions set out in §4(a) of the Voting Rights
Act.108 Previous research suggests that several factors will influence state
105 See 52 U.S.C.A. § 10303(b) (West).
106 See Edward A. Miller & David Blanding, Pressure Cooker Politics: Partisanship and
Symbolism in State Certification of Federal Stimulus Funds, 12 ST. POL. POL'Y Q., 58-74 (2012).
107 See Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 20.
108 But see Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (authorizing the bailout of a utility district in
Texas, and thereby establishing that all political subdivisions of a parent entity covered under §4(b)
may sue to terminate preclearance requirements if these subdivisions lack any ostensible history of
racially discriminatory electoral devices or low voter turnout).
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and local compliance with the mandates of the Voting Rights Act.10 9 From
this we can derive some hypotheses about the factors that will influence the
likelihood of bailing out.
The factor most likely to matter is the population's general disposition
toward federal policy activism. This disposition is referred to in political
science as policy mood."l 0 States vary across space and time in the degree
to which they embrace active federal government,"'1 and recent evidence
suggests that local governments are responsive to ambient public opinion
on issues like immigration."l 2 In particular, increased liberalism in policy
mood, where "liberalism" signifies a high level of comfort with federal
spending or policymaking in different arenas, can lead local governments
to adopt more liberal public policies."l 3 In this case, liberalism in policy
preferences implies comfort with federal supervision of election laws,
while conservatism implies discomfort with federal supervision of election
laws. Thus, we expect that covered jurisdictions within more ideologically
liberal states will be more likely to bail out under §4(a). It might seem
counterintuitive to predict that covered jurisdictions in areas where the
population has more liberal policy views are more likely to bail out; the
greater degree of comfort with federal activism that more liberal policy
mood implies arguably also implies a lower level of motivation to pursue
the autonomy bailout affords. Indeed, one might think that, contrary to
what we posit, a covered jurisdiction in a state that is less comfortable with
federal intervention would be more likely to attempt to terminate federal
supervision of its election laws by bailing out. Yet we believe that covered
jurisdictions in more ideologically liberal states will be more likely to
comply with the prerequisites of bailout, and by doing so, increase their
chances of successfully bailing out. Higher levels of liberalism in state
policy mood should thus be associated with a higher probability of bailing
out.
The literature suggests that in addition to policy mood, demographics,
region, and partisanship can influence state and local responses to federal
109 See infra notes 111-14.
110 See Policy Mood, UNC.EDU, http://www.unc.edu/-cogginse/PolicyMood.htm (last
visited Jun. 21, 2015).
1II Peter Enns & Julianna Koch, Public Opinion in the U.S. States: 1956 to 2010, 13 ST. POL.
POL'Y Q. 349, 358 (2013).
112 Daniel J. Hopkins, Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke
Local Opposition, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 40, 55-6 (2010).
113 See MARK J. HETHERINGTON, WHY TRUST MATTERS: DECLINING POLITICAL TRUST AND
THE DEMISE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM 57 (2005).
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policy. 114 The demographic characteristic that could affect both the
likelihood of bailing out and the policy liberalism of a state is the size of
the black population in a covered jurisdiction. Studies linking larger black
populations to higher levels of black voter registration, turnout, and office
holding affirm that a key ingredient in political empowerment is numerical
capacity. 115 Covered jurisdictions with a larger black population could have
more of the wherewithal to satisfy the requirements of bailout, though if the
black share of the population is in some way a proxy for political
empowerment, it is also possible that these jurisdictions will have less
desire or need to exercise the bailout option of the Voting Rights Act.
Regional culture is another factor studies have linked to state and local
policymaking."l 6 In his seminal work on federalism, Professor Daniel
Elazar argued that states operate according to three distinct political
subcultures: traditionalistic, moralistic, and individualistic."i 7 Scholars
have paid particular attention to the effects of political culture in the South,
where historical events like the Civil War and Civil Rights Movement have
burnished a distinctive legacy of anti-federalism. 118 Prominent examples of
the South's cultural aversion to the federal government include the
"massive resistance" movement, which ensued after Brown v. Board of
Education119 was decided, and Barry Goldwater's libertarian and socially
conservative presidential campaign.120 Isolating the South in statistical
models is often an effective way to determine whether differences in policy
outcomes result from regional subcultures. The effects of culture are
114 See, e.g., Edward Alan Miller & David Blanding, Pressure Cooker Politics: Partisanship
and Symbolism in State Certification of Federal Stimulus Funds, 12 STATE POL. POL'Y Q. 58 (2012)
(finding that states with Republican governors certified their intent to accept federal stimulus funds
seven days later, on average, than states with Democratic governors); Pam R. Shah, Melissa J.
Marschall, & Anirudh V.S. Ruhil, Are We There Yet? The Voting Rights Act and Black Representation
on City Councils, 1981 - 2006, 75 J. POL. 993 (2013) (finding, inter alia, that cities covered under §5
of the VRA are significantly more likely to elect African Americans to office than cities not covered
under §5).
115 See Melissa J. Marschall, Anirudh V.S. Ruhil & Paru R. Shah, The New Racial Calculus:
Electoral Institutions and Black Representation in Local Legislatures, 54 AM. J. POLIT. SCI. 107, 116-
120(2010); Paru R. Shah, Melissa J. Marschall, & Anirudh V.S. Ruhil, Are We There Yet? The Voting
Rights Act and Black Representation on City Councils, 1981 - 2006, 75 J. POL. 993, 1003-4 (2013).
116 See infra note 114.
117 Daniel J. Elazar, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES (1966).
Traditionalistic cultures believe the role of government is to protect the existing social hierarchy, with
elites at the top. Moralistic cultures are those that believe government must promote equality and social
justice. Finally, individualistic cultures believe government should be very limited, functioning largely
if not exclusively to protect the market.
118 See V. 0. Key, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION (1949).
119 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 438 (1954).
120 See EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 48-49 (1989).
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difficult to predict in this case. The South's anti-federalist culture could
motivate covered jurisdictions in the region to seek bailouts, thus
increasing their chances of actually bailing out. But the regional culture
might also deter covered areas from following the rules that are sine qua
non of bailout. We shall see if being in the South is a harbinger of eventual
restoration of autonomy or persistent subservience to the federal
government.
A final factor that research on federalism and policymaking suggests
could influence the chances of bailout in covered jurisdictions is
partisanship.121 Both elite and mass partisanship can influence state
responses to federal legislation. For lay voters, symbolic attachments to a
party label shape both awareness of and affect toward political issues. For
political leaders, partisanship affects the policy options identified and the
criteria used to adjudicate between policy alternatives. One study
conducted after the passage of the 2009 American Reinvestment and
Recovery Act122 found that states with Republican governors took
significantly longer to certify their intent to accept federal stimulus funds
than states led by Democrats. 123 The study argued that these governors
were under pressure to stanch worsening recessions without appearing to
endorse the economic policy approach of the newly elected Democratic
president. 124 Attachment to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party
may similarly shape compliance with bailout requirements and the pursuit
of bailout.
To estimate the probability that covered jurisdictions bail out, we
collected data on political entities across the United States that have been
brought under the auspices of the federal government at some point since
the Voting Rights Act was adopted in 1965.125 In states that are fully
covered, the unit of analysis is the county. In states that are not fully
covered, like Alaska and New Hampshire, the unit of analysis is an
autonomous political subdivision of the state that was specifically cited for
121 Partisan Definition, merriam-webster.com, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/partisanship (last visited Jun. 21, 2015) ("1: a firm adherent to a party, faction,
cause or person; especially: one exhibiting blind, prejudiced, and unreasoning allegiance").
122 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115
(2009).
123 See infra note 121.
124 Edward Alan Miller & David Blanding, Pressure Cooker Politics: Partisanship and
Symbolism in State Certification of Federal Stimulus Funds, 12 STATE POL. POL'Y Q. 58, 62-3 (2012).
125 We treat independent cities, parishes, or other political units as county equivalents for the
purposes of our analysis. Since these do not overlap with any counties that are covered, there is no
danger that data on these units might erroneously be double-counted within our dataset. Special Project
Grant for Comty. Health Serv, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
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coverage under the Voting Rights Act at some point and is thus
functionally equivalent to a covered county. Our dataset consists of 949 of
these counties and county equivalents in total.
This approach offers important methodological advantages over using
larger or smaller units of analysis. We could have assembled a dataset
comprised of states that have been fully or partially covered by the VRA.
However, a dataset of this type would have included significantly fewer
observations, as only 21 states have been affected by the VRA, and this is
far too few for a robust multivariate analysis. Using counties as the unit of
analysis yields a sample in which it is possible to observe systematic
patterns and relationships along a number of different dimensions
simultaneously. We could also have assembled a dataset comprised of
smaller units of analysis, such as cities, towns, or electoral precincts. As
noted above, a number of municipalities have also been subject to
preclearance requirements independently of states. However, using
cotnties and county equivalents enables us to capture data on important
measures of interest that are not available for units smaller than states. This
is especially critical given that we are interested in jurisdictions covered
under Voting Rights Act. Most covered jurisdictions are in the South,
where counties are typically the smallest autonomous political unit for
which a range of germane political data is available.126 In sum, relying
upon counties and county equivalents as the unit of analysis maximizes the
size of our sample, facilitates more accurate and robust statistical analysis,
and provides access to relevant electoral data.
Among the measures we are able to include because of this
methodological choice are the percentage of black residents in the
jurisdiction, the political partisanship of residents of the jurisdictions, and
the state's policy mood. To capture the possible effect of differences in
black political empowerment, we calculated the percentage of the county
population that was black as of the last U.S. Census. This is consistent with
previous literature suggesting that black voters will be more politically
engaged and efficacious where they constitute a higher share of the
population and electorate.127
We operationalize states' general dispositions toward the federal
government using the variable state mood. States exhibiting more liberal
126 See Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 20.
127 See Marschall, Ruhil & Shah, supra, note 63; Shah, Marschall, & Ruhil, supra, note 63;
But see Kim Quaile Hill & Jan E. Leighley, Racial Diversity, Voter Turnout, and Mobilizing Institutions
in the United States, 27 AM. POL. RES. 275, 285 (1999) (finding that racial diversity depresses voter
turnout).
2015] BAILOUTS UNDER SEC27ON4 OF THE VOTING RIGHTSACT 23
policy moods are more accepting of federal policy, while states with more
conservative policy moods are more resistant to federal policymaking.
State mood is an adaptation of a national-level index that has been used in
numerous social science studies over the past three decades.12 8 The index
aggregates mass preferences for more or less government activity across a
range of policy domains into a single underlying dimension that represents
the nation's views of how involved the federal government should be in
public policy along a continuum from conservative to liberal.129 State
mood was derived from this identical measure of the nation's preferences
for federal intervention using a statistical procedure called multilevel
regression and post-stratification.130 The higher the value of this variable
the more the state prefers the federal government to be involved; the lower
the value of the variable, the more the state prefers a restrained federal
government. Consistent with our hypothesis that a more liberal state policy
ideology will increase the chances of bailout out, we expect that higher
values of state mood will be associated with a greater probability of bailing
out.
We control for three additional factors that might distinguish
jurisdictions that bail out from those that do not. The first of these control
variables is political partisanship. We identified political partisanship in
each covered jurisdiction by calculating Obama's share of the two-party
vote in the 2012 election in each political jurisdiction. The values of this
variable theoretically range from zero to 100, with higher values signifying
stronger allegiance to the Democratic Party and lower values signifying
stronger allegiance to the Republican Party.
The second factor we account for in our models is the version of the
Voting Rights Act coverage formula under which each jurisdiction was
128 The original national-level mood variable is described in James A. Stimson, PUBLIC
OPINION IN AMERICA: MOODS, CYCLES, AND SWINGS (1991). Studies have used mood to assess trends
in mass policy preferences, as well as the relationship between mass policy preferences and federal and
state policy outcomes. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the
Supreme Court-Possibly Yes (But We're Not Sure Why), 13 UNIV. PENNSYLVANIA J. CONST. LAW 263,
277-279 (2010); Sean Nicholson-Crotty, David A. M. Peterson, & Mark D. Ramirez, Dynamic
Representation(s): Federal Criminal Justice Policy and an Alternative Dimension of Public Mood, 31
POLIT. BEHAV. 629, 647-651 (2009); James A. Stimson, TIDES OF CONSENT: HOW PUBLIC OPINION
SHAPES AMERICAN POLITICS (2004); James A. Stimson, Michael B. Mackuen, & Robert S. Erikson,
Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. POLIT. SCI. REV. 543, 552-559 (1995).
129 The preferences themselves are identified using national surveys administered since 1952
that include questions on subjects such as education spending, national defense, and government
involvement in civil rights enforcement. See JAMES A. STIMSON, PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA:
MOODS, CYCLES, AND SWINGS (Westview Press 1991).
130 See Peter Enns & Julianna Koch, Public Opinion in the U.S. States: 1956 to 2010, 13
STATE POLIT. POLICY Q. 349, 351-353 (2013), available at
http://falcon.arts.cornell.edu/pe52/EnnsKochSPPQ.pdf.
24 JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT [Vol. 28:1
covered. The Voting Rights Act's coverage formula has been revised three
times to account for changes in the nature of racially discriminatory
electoral activity from outright voter disfranchisement to more subtle vote
dilution, and each of those iterations of the coverage formula brought new
jurisdictions under the auspices of the federal government. Accounting for
which iteration of the coverage formula each jurisdiction was subject to
helps us appreciate the extent to which the changes in the coverage formula
have themselves influenced the chances of bailing out. The extent to which
differences in the coverage formula can explain differences in the
probability of bailing out should reveal much about the prudence of
attacking the coverage formula in Shelby County v. Holder.131 We
operationalize the three versions of the coverage formula using a series of
dichotomous categorical variables representing the 1965, 1970 and 1975
coverage formulas. A For each of these "dummy" variables, each
jurisdiction is coded one if it was brought in under the corresponding
version of the coverage formula, and zero otherwise. Thus, for example, a
jurisdiction covered under the 1970 formula would be coded one on the
1970formula dummy variable, and zero on both the 1965 and 1975 dummy
variables.
The third factor we consider is whether a covered jurisdiction is in the
South. Since racial discrimination in voting was more pronounced and
pervasive in the South than outside of it when the Voting Rights Act was
first adopted, most covered jurisdictions are in the South. Jurisdictions
were coded one if they are in any of the 11 states that seceded from the
Union during the Civil War, and zero if they are not. 132
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the variables used to estimate the
probability of bailing out. Most of the indicators of interest vary
considerably. Yet it must be noted that a small fraction of covered
jurisdictions have bailed out. As of 2013, 88 (9.45 percent) covered
jurisdictions had successfully exercised the "bailout" mechanism, while the
remaining 843 had not. This statistic lends credence to former Department
of Justice attorney Gerald Hebert's observation that "the real problem is
that jurisdictions are just not applying."' 33 Yet we believe that the paucity
of bailouts makes it even more valuable to identify any systematic
distinctions that might exist between those jurisdictions that bail out and
131 See Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
132 The 11 states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
133 J. Gerald Hebert, Voting Rights Act Reauthorization of 2006, BERKELEY CENTER FOR
LAW, 271 (2006), available at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/ch 10 herbert 3-9-07.pdf.
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those that do not.
Turning to the other factors, we can see that covered jurisdictions were
about 24 percent black as of 2013 on average, although the black share of
the population in these jurisdictions varied as much as 20 percentage points
around that mean, and ranged from zero percent in Skagway, AL to 85.7
percent in Jefferson County, Mississippi. Partisanship also varies
significantly across covered areas, with Obama earning his smallest share
of the two-party vote (11.12 percent) in Carmon Parish, Louisiana and his
highest share (100 percent) in Prikham's Grant, New Hampshire. All of the
covered jurisdictions were brought in under the first three iterations of the
Voting Rights Act: 595 (62.7 percent) were covered under the original
1965 law, 50 (5.27 percent) were covered after the VRA was reauthorized
and the coverage formula was modified, and 304 (32.03 percent) were
covered after the formula was modified for a third and final time in 1975.
Not all of those districts were covered at the same time: 279 were covered
on September 23, 1975, one was covered on October 22, 1975, two were
covered on January 5, 1976, and four were covered on August 13, 1976.
Notably, no jurisdictions were brought under federal supervision when the
VRA was reauthorized in 1982 or 2006, nor were there any modifications
to the coverage formula.
Table 1. Characteristics of Covered Jurisdictions (N = 949)
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Dev.
Percent Black 20.781 19.490 0 85.7
State Mood 38.695 2.668 32.72 54.97
Obama's Share 51.541 20.569 11.123 100
of Two-Party
Vote
Note: the number of observations in the models presented will be
less than in this table. Jurisdictions in Alaska are excluded
because of incomplete data
Table 2 reports the results of multivariate logistic regressions predicting
the probability that a covered jurisdiction had bailed out as of 2013.
Coefficients on each independent variable are expressed as odds ratios for
easier interpretation. Odds ratios vary from zero to one and can be
multiplied by 100 to represent the percentage increase or decrease in the
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probability of an outcome of interest. For any continuous variable in our
model, an odds ratio greater than one should be interpreted as an increase
in the probability of bailing out given a one percent increase in the
corresponding variable, while an odds ratio smaller than one should be
interpreted as a decrease in the probability of bailing out given a one
percent increase in the corresponding variable. Odds ratios on categorical
variables should be interpreted somewhat differently. With categorical
variables, an odds ratio greater than one signifies that jurisdictions
belonging in a given category are more likely to bail out than jurisdictions
belonging in a "reference" category not shown in the table, while an odds
ratio smaller than one signifies that jurisdictions belonging in a given
category are less likely to bail out than jurisdictions belonging in the
reference category.
Table 2. Estimating the Probability of Bailout in Covered Jurisdictions
All South Non-
South
State Mood 1.319* 3.902*** 0.649
(0.160) (1.281) (0.165)
Percent Black 0.885*** 0.898** 0.923
(0.021) (0.018) (0.039)







Constant <0.000 <0.000 <0.000
(0.0002) (8.25x10- (2.13x10
25) 9)
N 928 852 76
Wald 2  45.63*** 193.89*** 9.23*
-2 Log Likelihood 257.821 147.090 57.727
Entries are odds ratios. Figures in parentheses are standard errors, clustered
by state. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Jurisdictions in Alaska are
excluded because of incomplete data. The reference category for the VRA
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coverage formula variables is the 1965 formula; thus, the odds ratios for the
formula variables should be interpreted as differences in the likelihood of
bailing out if a jurisdiction was covered under the 1970 and 1975 formulas
and the likelihood of bailing out if a jurisdiction was covered under the
1965 formula.
Results in Column 1 support our hypothesis that covered jurisdictions
are significantly more likely to bail out as the policy mood of the state in
which the covered jurisdiction lies becomes more liberal. Ceteris paribus,
covered jurisdictions are approximately 32 percent more likely to bail out
for each additional unit of liberalism in state mood (OR: 1.319; p = 0.023;
32% z 1.00 - 1.319 x 100). To put this another way, the more citizens in a
state embrace active federal government, the more likely a covered
jurisdiction in that state is to bail out. At the same time, results also indicate
that there is an inverse relationship between the probability of bailout and
the black share of the population. The odds ratio on percent black signifies
that the probability of bailing out declines approximately 12 percent on
average each time the black share of a covered jurisdiction's population
increases (OR = 0.884; p < 0.0001; 12% z 1.00 - 0.884 x 100). Thus,
covered jurisdictions where African Americans comprise a larger share of
the population are less likely to bail out from the preclearance requirements
of the Voting Rights Act. One possible explanation for this finding is that
covered jurisdictions with larger black populations are more comfortable
with federal oversight of elections, as the African American populations of
these districts stand to benefit from such oversight. In other words, percent
black may be a crude proxy for local political mood; a higher share of
black residents may simply signify a more positive disposition toward the
federal government as a policy interloper and therefore greater comfort
with federal supervision of election laws. We do not find evidence of a
high correlation between the black share of a covered jurisdiction's
population and the liberalism of policy preferences in the outlying state.
Thus, it is fair to say that these two factors exert independent pressures
upon covered jurisdictions where they exert any at all.
Finally, the results suggest that jurisdictions that were brought under the
auspices of the federal government as a result of the coverage formula
adopted in 1970 are approximately 30 times more likely to bail out than
jurisdictions covered under the 1965 law. On the other hand, we find that
jurisdictions covered as a result of the 1975 law are not significantly less
likely to bail out than jurisdictions covered as result of the 1965 law (OR =
0.056; p = 0.06). Likewise, there is no evidence of a statistical relationship
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between political partisanship in covered jurisdictions and the probability
of bailing out. Covered jurisdictions that gave a greater share of the two-
party vote to President Obama in 2012 are not significantly more likely to
have bailed out than covered jurisdictions that voted more strongly for
Obama's Republican opponent.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 disaggregate the models according to
whether covered jurisdictions are in southern states. Of the 949 covered
jurisdictions identified in our dataset, the vast majority (89.99 percent) are
in the South. Only 95 covered jurisdictions (10.01 percent) were in states
outside the South. This divide is a reminder that the original coverage
formula was designed to capture the region where racial discrimination in
voting was most pronounced and pervasive. Imbued as it is with such
historical, political, and sociological significance, this regional distinction
may also explain differences in the probability of bailing out under the
Voting Rights Act. The model in Column 2 essentially tests where there is
an interaction between region and the other variables in the model. Of
particular interest to us is the possibility that the unique culture of the South
might affect the strength of the effect of policy mood on bailing out. The
evidence from the model in Column 2 validates that suspicion: ceteris
paribus, covered jurisdictions in the South are nearly four times more likely
to bail out on average for each unit increase in the liberalism of state policy
mood (OR: 3.902; p < 0.001). Conversely, we can see from Column 3 that
the probability of bailing out does not increase significantly as state mood
becomes more liberal in covered jurisdictions outside the South.
Table 3 reports the results of models incorporating another set of
interactions. Specifically, the models in these columns test for the existence
of an interaction between state policy mood and percent black. Earlier we
noted that while the percentage of black residents in a covered jurisdiction
might also be, like state mood, a sign of affect toward the federal
government, state mood and percent black were not strongly correlated.
This does not, however, preclude the possibility of an interactive
relationship between state mood and percent black. It is possible that
covered jurisdictions with larger black populations that also lie in states
with more liberal policy preferences will be less likely to bail out than their
counterparts in states with less liberal policy preferences. Given our earlier
finding that a higher black share of a jurisdictions population is associated
with a lower probability of bailing out, this possibility does not seem
remote. While jurisdictions in more liberal states may be more likely to
comply with the stipulations for bailing out, jurisdictions in which a larger
share of the population stands to benefit from retaining federal supervision
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of election laws may be less likely to pursue bailout. In short, state mood
and racial demographics may work at cross purposes for covered
jurisdictions. Although jurisdictions characterized by both high ambient
policy liberalism and large black populations may be better positioned to
bail out, they may be less inclined to bail out. If this is true, the coefficient
on the interaction of state mood and percent black will be negative,
signifying that the chances of bailing out decline as policy liberalism and
the size of the black share of the population both increase.
The results in Table 3 suggest that there are interactive effects between
state mood and percent black; however, these effects occur only among
covered jurisdictions in the South. The interaction of state mood and
percent black has a statistically significant coefficient only in the South
model, presented in Column 2. Since it is less than one, the coefficient
signifies a decline in the probability of bailing out. To be precise, the
coefficient signifies that, ceteris paribus, the probability of bailing out in
the South decreases about 2.4 percent on average as both state mood and
percent black increase. This finding is consistent with our expectation that
covered jurisdictions that have larger black populations and are in states
with more liberal policy positions will be less likely to bailout. In the
South, the demographic characteristics of covered jurisdictions and policy
ideology of the surrounding state operate at cross purposes.




State Mood 1.286 5.040*** 0.657
(0.169) (1.685) (0.181)
Percent Black 0.727 2.419** 1.154
(0.286) (0.702) (0.937)
State Mood x Percent Black 1.005 0.976*** 0.995
(0.01) (0.007) (0.019)
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Constant <0.000* <0.000 <0.000
(0.0001) (8.25x10 (2.13x10
25) 9)
N 928 852 76
Wald X2  99.81*** 3600.10*** 9.20
-2 Log Likelihood 257.435 145.802 57.677
Entries are odds ratios. Figures in parentheses are standard errors, clustered
by state. *p <_ 0.05; ** p <_ 0.01; ***p <_ 0.001. Jurisdictions in Alaska are
excluded because of incomplete data. The reference category for the VRA
coverage formula variables is the 1965 formula; thus, the odds ratios for the
formula variables should be interpreted as differences in the likelihood of
bailing out if a jurisdiction was covered under the 1970 and 1975 formulas
and the likelihood of bailing out if a jurisdiction was covered under the
1965 formula.
Overall, our results indicate that state public policy liberalism, local
racial demographics, and federal legislative changes are linked to a covered
jurisdiction's probability of bailing out. Moreover, there is evidence that
the positive effect state policy liberalism has upon the chances of bailout
are attenuated by the size of the black share of a covered jurisdiction's
population: the larger this share, the smaller the impact state policy
liberalism has. We are cautious of extrapolating the existence of a causal
relationship from these results, as additional analysis would be required to
establish whether changes in the variables shown here to have a significant
relationship with bailout actually cause changes in the probability of
bailout. Nevertheless, the results point to some possible explanations for
the fact that some covered jurisdictions have bailed out while others have
not. The evidence corroborates some prior studies of the bailout process, 134
but casts doubt upon assumptions made within the Supreme Court about
the difficulties of bailing out under the coverage and bailout provisions in
operation when Shelby County v. Holder135 was decided. The persistence of
federal supervision of election laws in covered jurisdictions seems to be at
least partly a function of the sociopolitical characteristics of covered
jurisdictions.
134 See, e.g., Hebert, supra note 9.
135 Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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IV. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
In adopting the 1965 Voting Rights Act, Congress exercised its 15'
h
Amendment authority to ensure that the right to vote was not denied or
abridged on account of race or skin color. 136 The Supreme Court's
invalidation of §4(b) of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby County marked the
end of decades of judicial support for the basic constitutionality of the
Voting Rights Act. 137 Amidst changing patterns of black registration,
turnout, and representation in government, the Court determined that it had
no choice but to find the formula unconstitutional. 13 8 The fact that such a
consequential decision turned on the perception that the burdens the VRA
imposed on states were no longer compatible with political reality draws
our attention to the provision of the VRA ostensibly designed to offset the
federalism costs of preclearance by giving states and localities a way to
reclaim their autonomy. The Supreme Court gave little heed to this
balancing mechanism, seemingly already convinced that it was either
irrelevant or inutile. Yet we show here that the bailout mechanism has
produced the desired effects for dozens of covered jurisdictions: rewarding
consistently nondiscriminatory behavior with administrative autonomy.
Moreover, our statistical models reveal that is it possible to identify factors
conducive to bailout.
Congress cannot simply reverse course on the Voting Rights Act and
reinstate the invalidated coverage formula; it will need to devise a formula
that both accomplishes the venerable goals of the original law and passes
the "current conditions" test the Roberts Court seemed to announce in
Shelby. 139 A bill to amend the Voting Rights Act introduced by Senator
Patrick Leahy in 2014 devoted a substantial portion of its real estate to
modifying §4(b) to capture today's perpetrators of electoral
improprieties.140 Yet revising §4(a) to facilitate more bailouts might also
go a long way toward mollifying the concerns about federalism that
underlay the "current conditions" argument in Shelby,141 and are likely to
frame judicial reviews of the Voting Rights Act for at least the near future.
Building upon Gerald Hebert's observation that every jurisdiction that has
136 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XV
137 E.g., Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2612.
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 S. 1945, 113h Cong. (2014). New bills have been introduced in 2015, including S. 1659
and H.R. 2867.
141 Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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applied for bailout since 1982 has been successful,142 this study identifies
the political and demographic characteristics that make applications for
bailout more enticing. The bailout provision that emerges from
congressional debates over the Voting Rights Act should be one that
anticipates how these ideological and demographic characteristics will
shape the behavior of jurisdictions covered under a revised VRA.
142 See Hebert, supra note 9, at 270.
